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NOTE
U.S. ASS 'N OF IMPORTERS OF TEXTILES &
APPAREL V. UNITED STATES: THE IMPACT OF
INCONSISTENT DOMESTIC AGENCY
PROCEDURES GOVERNING TEXTILE-SPECIFIC
SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON THE BUSINESS
OPERATIONS OF U.S. IMPORTERS
Sarah O'Hare O'Neal'
Since the early 1960s, U.S. textile importers have conducted their
business operations under quantitative quotas.' Despite the fact that
employment in the domestic textile industry during the life of the quota
' J.D., May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Rett Ludwikowski for his instruction, counsel, and
support of her interest in the area of international trade and customs law. The author also
wishes to thank David M. Murphy for his generosity in reviewing, and his willingness to
discuss, earlier drafts of this article. The author would like to extend a special thanks to
her husband, Kevin O'Neal, for his constant encouragement.
1. See Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, The Multifiber Arrangement:
"Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 51, 52-53 (1987); see
also Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, art. 2, Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001 [hereinafter MFA] (setting forth a textile trade agreement, which was
negotiated to allow textile trading nations to impose quantitative restrictions on imports of
textile and apparel products under certain circumstances). For the last forty years, the
textile and apparel industry has been subjected to some form of quantitative restraint.
Giesse & Lewin, supra, at 52-53. Although the principles upon which the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was based consisted of nondiscriminatory
treatment for all of its members and the eventual elimination of quantitative trade
barriers, an exception has always existed for the textile and apparel industry. Id. at 51-53;
see also JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 401 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that
the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, enacted in
October 1961, and initially scheduled to expire in September 1962, was extended in
October 1962 by the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles, and was eventually succeeded by the MFA in 1974). Such "temporary
protection" has served to insulate the United States from textile imports from the "Lesser
Developed Countries" since the enactment of section 204 of the Agricultural Act. Giesse
& Lewin, supra, at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted). The comprehensive regulatory
scheme that evolved as a result "has protected the U.S. textile and apparel sector more
extensively and for a longer period than the protection afforded to any other U.S.
manufacturing industry." Id. at 53-54.
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system fell from approximately one million to 400,000 jobs 2 U.S.
importers have continuously been forced to sacrifice optimal business
success in the name of unsuccessful efforts to protect the domestic textile
industry.3 The importers' predicament has been exacerbated by the
absence of clearly defined, consistent procedures for applying these
quantitative restrictions on textile imports.4  The textile-specific
safeguard mechanism, established in 2000 as a condition to China's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), imposed another
unclearly defined restriction on U.S. textile importers.' Although the
2. Paul Blustein, Deal on Textiles May Only Delay China's Dominance, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2005, at A24 ("The U.S. [domestic textile] industry lost jobs at a terrible clip
when the global quota system was in effect .... ").
3. See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 1, at 81-82 (concluding, based on the condition of
the U.S. textile and apparel industry at that time, that the "unparalleled level of
protection" it received was unwarranted); infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
Moreover, this level of protection has not been based on economics, but "[r]ather, politics
[have] dictate[d] policy choices in the realm of U.S. textile and apparel trade .... to satisfy
the demands of a powerful, special interest group." Id.
4. See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 1, at 125 (discussing the "storm of objections"
raised when the Reagan administration issued guidelines that reduced the criteria for
implementing restraints on textile imports from a showing of "actual 'market disruption'
or the threat thereof" to creating a "'presumption of market disruption"'). This criterion
seemed to conflict with the terms of the MFA, which requires a measurable determination
of market disruption, and not one "'determined to exist on the basis of allegation,
conjecture or mere possibility."' Id. (quoting MFA, supra note 1, Annex A, para. 1). It
seemed that U.S. textile importers and the domestic textile industry had reached a
compromise in 1994 when the United States and other GATT members established the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to promote free trade, eliminate non-tariff
trade barriers, and reduce tariffs. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
However, recognizing that sensitive industries, such as the textile and clothing industry,
required a progressive integration process to facilitate adjustment to GATT rules, GATT
members enacted the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, art. 6, para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/englishidocselegal-e/16-tex.pdf [hereinafter ATC]. This agreement,
though it permitted quantitative restrictions on textiles that would temporarily hinder the
businesses of U.S. importers of textiles, sought to do so "consistently" and "as sparingly as
possible." Id. paras. 1-2. Further, the ATC was designed to gradually phase out these
restrictions, leading to their eventual extinction at the end of ten years, a period of time
determined sufficient for the U.S. domestic textile industry, as well as that of other GATT
members, to adjust and "contribut[e] to the objective of further liberalization of trade."
See id. pmbl., art. 9.
5. See World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession
of the People's Republic of China, pt. I, § 16, para. 1, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc [hereinafter Accession
Agreement]; World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, para. 242, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/completeacc-e.htm [hereinafter Working
Report] (delineating China's conditions for accession). Prior to the expiration of the
ATC, China agreed to the creation of two transitional specific safeguard mechanisms as a
[Vol. 55:11691170
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Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA)6 has
published procedures for handling requests for restrictions on textile
imports,' U.S. importers have challenged the level of clarity of these
procedures, CITA's adherence to them, and CITA's very authority to
carry them out.s
precondition to its accession to the WTO: a product-specific safeguard and a textile
safeguard. See Working Report, supra, paras. 242(a), 245. The Chinese textile safeguard
provides for a transitional textile safeguard remedy that WTO Members may invoke
against importations of Chinese textiles for a limited duration. Id. para. 242(a).
Specifically, the pertinent provision provides:
[I]n the event that a WTO Member believed that imports of Chinese origin of
textiles and apparel products covered by the ATC as of the date the WTO
Agreement entered into force, were, due to market disruption, threatening to
impede the orderly development of trade in these products, such Member could
request consultations with China with a view to easing or avoiding such market
disruption.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. See Exec. Order No. 11,651, 3 C.F.R. 676 (1971-1975) (establishing CITA).
CITA, the inter-departmental agency that claims the authority to supervise the
implementation of these safeguards, consists of representatives from the Departments of
State, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor, and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative. Id. The President issued this order pursuant to his delegated authority
under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (2000), which provides
that the President is authorized to negotiate agreements concerning textiles. Id. Congress
expressly amended this Act to include the ATC within the meaning of "textile
agreements." Id.; see also Fieldston Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1181,
1182-83 (1995) (describing CITA's role).
7. See Procedures for Considering Requests from the Public for Textile and Apparel
Safeguard Actions on Imports from China, 68 Fed. Reg. 27,787, 27,787 (May 19, 2003)
[hereinafter China Textile Safeguard Procedures]. On May 19, 2003, CITA published, by
Federal Register notice, procedures for the consideration of requests from the public for
invocation of the textile safeguard provided in the Working Report. Id. The notice
establishes that CITA will publish procedures and petitions requesting safeguard measures
via the Federal Register and allow thirty days for public comments. Id. at 27,789. The
notice further states that the Committee will make determinations in a manner
"[c]onsistent with longstanding Committee practice in considering textile safeguard
actions," and the newly established May 19, 2003 procedures. Id. at 27,788 (emphasis
added). A request would only be considered if it included the following: product
description; import data; production data; market share data; and additional information
such as price. Id. at 27,788-89.
8. See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of
Importers 1), 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346-47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); see also China Textile
Safeguard Procedures, supra note 7, at 27,788 (regarding CITA's interpretation of its
authority). It is worth noting that Congress has not enacted legislation setting forth or
clarifying procedures by which CITA shall implement safeguard measures, and CITA is
the only agency that unilaterally engages in imposing safeguards for which no statutory
procedures exist. See Greg Hitt, How the Textile Industry Alone Won Quotas on Chinese
Imports, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at A10; cf Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251(b),
2252, 2451 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (setting forth clear statutory procedures by which the
International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Department of Commerce (DOC)
administer ordinary safeguards and Chinese product-specific safeguards respectively).
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In October 2004, prompted by concerns that the termination of the
current system governing textile and apparel quotas under the WTO 9
would result in an unprecedented surge of textile imports from China,
CITA took preemptive action.'0 CITA permitted additional requests for
safeguards against textile imports based on a mere threat of market
disruption, as opposed to a showing of actual disruption." In response,
several U.S. importers alleged that allowing safeguards to be based only
on the threat of market harm represented an unpublished and
impermissible change to prior procedures and practices. 2  This
reinterpretation left U.S. textile importers in a state of uncertainty as to
Moreover, with respect to all other safeguard measures, clear statutory definitions are
provided, which closely mirror language contained in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards,
and which have been interpreted numerous times by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a), (c), 2451(a), (c), (d), with Agreement on
Safeguards, pmbl., arts. 2, 4, Apr. 15, 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/25-
safeg.pdf; see also Appellate Body Report, United States - Transitional Safeguard
Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, paras. 71, 74, 86 & n.56,
WT/DS192/AB/R (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Cotton Yarn]; Appellate Body Report,
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, at 19
n. 29, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Cotton & Fibre Underwear]. Under 19
U.S.C. § 2451(d), for example, the imported product causing alleged injury must be "like
or directly competitive" to a product produced by the domestic industry suffering injury.
19 U.S.C. § 2451(d)(2), (3). This requirement, which is also stated in CITA's China
Textile Safeguard Procedures, has been defined by statute, legislative history, and by the
ITC in its investigations. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(4); S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 121-22 (1974);
H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 45 (1973); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBL'N NO. 3622,
CERTAIN BRAKE DRUMS AND ROTORS FROM CHINA 7-8 (2003); U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, PUBL'N NO. 3575, CERTAIN STEEL WIRE GARMENT HANGERS FROM CHINA 5-
6 (2003); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBL'N NO. 3557, PEDESTAL ACTUATORS FROM
CHINA 5-6 (2002) [hereinafter PEDESTAL ACTUATORS FROM CHINA] ("[T]he [ITC]
follows a two-step practice of first determining what constitutes the product like or
directly competitive with the imports subject to the investigation, and then identifying who
produces it (the domestic industry)."). In step one, when assessing what constitutes the
"[like or directly competitive domestic article," the ITC applies the definition found in
the legislative history of section 202 of the Trade Act of 1974 and "consider[s] such factors
as (1) the physical properties of the article, (2) its customs treatment, (3) its manufacturing
process ... (4) its uses, and (5) the marketing channels through which the product is sold."
PEDESTAL ACTUATORS FROM CHINA, supra, at 5-6. "[D]omestic product[s] need not be
identical to the imported product[s] . . . [but must be] 'substantially identical."' Id. at 6.
"[T]he [ITC] has found a domestic product to be a separate and distinct product.., when
it had different physical properties, was produced by a different process, or had different
applications. Id. Upstreaming, the affected industry's practice of including component
parts within the definition, has been held improper based on this theory. Cf id. at 5-9.
9. See ATC, supra note 4.
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how to continue to successfully conduct business operations. ' 3  In
addition, although the United States and China recently signed a
bilateral agreement establishing specific quota rates through 2008 for
thirty-four categories of textile products, 14 the agreement has left U.S.
textile importers even more unclear as to how CITA will handle pending
and future petitions for safeguards against the several categories of
textile products that were not included in the agreement. 5
In response to CITA's preemptive action, the Association of Importers
of Textiles and Apparel (U.S.-ITA) sought a preliminary injunction from
the Court of International Trade (CIT) in U.S. Ass'n of Importers of
Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of Importers I),6 to
prevent CITA from considering petitions for safeguard measures on
Chinese textile imports that were only "based on the threat of market
disruption."'7  The CIT granted U.S.-ITA's motion for a preliminary
injunction, concluding that: (1) denying relief would risk irreparable
injury to U.S.-ITA; (2) the balance of hardships favored U.S.-ITA; (3)
U.S.-ITA would likely succeed on the merits; and (4) relief would serve
the public interest.
13. See id. ("As a result of CITA's insupportable actions, plaintiff alleges that its
members' operations have been and will continue to be disrupted, and its members are
being forced to make sub-optimal business decisions that cannot be undone or reimbursed
if plaintiff ultimately succeeds on the merits of the case.").
14. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States
of America and the People's Republic of China Concerning Trade in Textile and Apparel
Products, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/WorldRegions/North-Asia/China/
asset-upload file9l 8344.pdf [hereinafter MOU].
15. See id. paras. 2, 3 (stating that categories 338/339, 638/639, 647/648 are expressly
excluded from, and ten categories for which safeguards were requested are not included
among, those products subject to quota levels under the U.S.-China Textile Agreement);
see also Memorandum from Laura E. Jones, U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel, to
Members, U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel 1, 3 (Nov. 14, 2005) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Jones Memorandum]. With respect to these categories, the United
States agreed to "exercise 'restraint"' in imposing safeguards pursuant to paragraph 242 of
the Working Report. MOU, supra note 14, para. 7; see also Jones Memorandum, supra, at
3 (stating that a decision by CITA to impose safeguards against the ten categories for
which petitions are pending would upset the "'balance"' sought by the agreement and
contradict the United States' commitment to exercising restraint).
16. 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
17. Id. at 1344. In September 2004, CITA and DOC officials announced that
safeguards based on the mere threat of a potential increase in importers were permitted
under China Textile Safeguard Regulations. Id. at 1346. This announcement was
inconsistent with statements made between July and August of 2004 that those regulations
"were intended for cases of actual market disruption rather than the threat of such
disruption." Id. (quoting China Textile Safeguards to Focus on Market Disruption Cases,
Official Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), July 23, 2004, at A-28 [hereinafter China
Textile Safeguards to Focus on Market Disruption]).
18. See id. at 1347-51.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
the CIT's decision, holding that the CIT abused its discretion in granting
a preliminary injunction. 9 The Federal Circuit held that the controversy
was not ripe for review, and that the U.S.-ITA failed to establish "a fair
chance of success on the merits."20
This Note examines the development of federal case law requirements
concerning consistency in CITA's procedures and the availability and
scope of judicial review of CITA's actions. First, this Note traces the
evolution of a presumption of reviewability in Supreme Court decisions
to an era marked with restrictions on when, and to what extent, an
agency action is subject to review. Secondly, this Note discusses the
Federal Circuit and CIT's maintenance of a broad availability of judicial
review, contrasted with a restrictive scope of judicial review, as applied to
agency actions that concern international trade. Third, this Note
evaluates the Federal Circuit's opinion in U.S. Ass'n of Importers of
Textile & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of Importers H),
demonstrating that the Federal Circuit strayed from both the Supreme
Court's and its own precedent governing the availability of judicial
review of agency actions, and, consequently, left the question concerning
the scope of CITA's authority unanswered. Finally, this Note addresses
the validity of the Federal Circuit's decision and its future impact,
highlighting the need for consistency and transparency in agency
procedures.
I. A TREND TOWARD RESTRICTED AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946," Congress
set forth standards by which a federal agency's actions may be subject to
22judicial review, as well as standards that the judiciary would apply in
reviewing an agency action.23  Additionally, the APA established
19. U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of
Importers I1), 413 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20. Id. at 1348-49, 1353-54.
21. ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (affording the right of review of an agency action to "[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute"); id. § 704 (requiring that there
be a "final agency action"); id. § 551 (providing that an agency action includes any "rule,"
defined by the APA as "an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe [general] law or policy").
23. See id. § 706 (providing that the reviewing court, where necessary, "shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action," and set aside
[Vol. 55:11691174
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procedures that an agency must follow, including both formal
adjudication processes and informal notice-and-comment procedures 4
Three pertinent provisions govern agency action: (1) availability of
review; (2) scope of review; and (3) procedural requirements." The APA
also established exceptions as to when an agency need not follow formal
and informal procedures.26  Over time, the courts shifted from
interpreting the APA as an Act that both affords a liberal availability of
review and mandates strict adherence to procedural requirements, to
interpreting the APA as an Act that significantly limits which agency
actions are subject to review and whose exceptions to its procedures
often apply.27
A. The Supreme Court Reinforces a Presumption of Judicial Review and
Emphasizes Consistency Under the APA
1. Presumption of Judicial Review
Prior to the adoption of the APA, the Supreme Court liberally granted
judicial review of agency actions, absent persuasive evidence that
those actions determined to be arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, or contrary to
statutory authority).
24. Id. §§ 552-553. Section 552 states in pertinent part:
Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public...
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all
papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Id. § 552. Section 553 provides:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register ....
Id. § 553.
25. Id. §§ 551-553, 702, 704, 706; see supra notes 21-24.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (also affording an exception for an agency action that is part of
the "foreign affairs function of the United States").
27. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1980); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
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granting judicial review would be contrary to congressional intent.
Upon the enactment of the APA, which "embodie[d] the basic
presumption of judicial review,"29 the Supreme Court continued to afford
unrestricted access to judicial review absent a clear and convincing
display of contrary legislative intent." The Court also applied a liberal
standard as to whether a final agency action existed to invoke standing
for judicial review. 3 Two cases, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.
32
and Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,33 represent the broad spectrum of
agency actions the Court has found to be covered under the APA.
In Storer Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of liberal agency review.-4 The case involved a notice of
proposed rulemaking issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), which precluded an applicant from acquiring
licenses for broadcasting stations if the applicant already possessed an
interest in a certain number of stations.35 The respondent, a licensee
owning more than seven broadcasting stations, argued that it would
suffer irreparable financial loss if it were forced to forfeit existing
36licenses. The Court held that the FCC's issuance of rules that placed
limits on the number of licenses for broadcasting stations by any one
party constituted a reviewable final agency action under the APA"
28. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140. A survey of Supreme Court cases supports a
liberal granting of judicial view. Id. (citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962); Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Brownell v. We
Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953); Bd. of Governors v.
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947)).
29. Id. The APA affords judicial review to one "suffering [a] legal wrong because of
agency action ... within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Louis
L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 432 (1958) ("[J]udicial
review is the rule ... a basic right; it is a traditional power and the intention to exclude it
must be made specifically manifest."); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next
Stage, 92 YALE L. J. 1487, 1489 n.l (1983) (noting that since the passage of the APA, the
sustained effort of administrative law has been to "continuously narro[w] the category of
actions considered to be so discretionary as to be exempted from review").
30. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 141. But see Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 350-51 (1984) (stating that although the Court has "never applied the 'clear and
convincing evidence' standard in the strict evidentiary sense .... [the standard operates
as] a useful reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt about the congressional
intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is
controlling.").
31. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140.
32. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
33. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
34. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 197 (acknowledging the availability of review of
any agency action where a party has been aggrieved by that action).
35. Id. at 193.
36. Id. at 196-97.
37. Id. at 198.
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The FCC's rules were subject to review because they "presently
affected existing contractual relationships... [and were] 'not any the less
reviewable because their promulgation did not operate of their own force
to deny or cancel a license."'38 The Court explained that the pertinent
provision of the APA provides that "review . . . is granted any party
aggrieved or suffering legal wrong by [an agency] action., 39 Further, the
Court concluded that a "legal wrong" need be "something more than a
mere adverse personal effect . . . the adverse effect must be an illegal
effect., 4 The Court found the respondent had been aggrieved because it
was precluded from acquiring FM stations and could not effectively planS 41
present and future business operations.
The Court reinforced the broad spectrum of agency actions subject to
judicial review in Abbott Laboratories.4 2 In this case, thirty-seven drug
manufacturers and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
brought an action against the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to
challenge the promulgation of regulations that required manufacturers to
prominently print the established name of a drug on all drug labels,
advertisements, and printed materials that display the drug's trade
name. 43 The plaintiffs alleged they were sufficiently aggrieved by these
regulations because they were forced to choose between incurring
substantial costs to comply with the regulations or risk prosecution for
distributing "misbranded" drugs.44 The Court agreed, holding that the
suit brought by the drug companies and their association was ripe for
judicial review.4 ' The Court reached its conclusion by applying a twofold
test for ripeness, evaluating "both the fitness of the issues for judicial
38. Id. at 199 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-18
(1942)). In Columbia Broadcasting System, the Court held that "[ilt [wa]s enough that, by
setting the controlling standards for the Commission's action, the regulations purport[ed]
to operate to alter and affect adversely appellant's contractual rights and business
relations with station owners." Columbia Broad. Sys., 316 U.S. at 422.
39. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 197.
40. Id. n.6. The Court relied on legislative history for the definition for "legal
wrong." H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 42 (1946); S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945).
41. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. at 199-200 (noting that the proposed amendments are
not any less reviewable "merely because it [was] not certain whether the Commission
w[ould] institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred"). The Court further
emphasized that Storer's grievance was that it could not "cogently plan its present or
future operations." Id. at 200; see also Columbia Broad. Sys., 316 U.S. at 422 (finding
sufficient as a final agency action, FCC regulations that would adversely affect the
appellant's business relations with broadcast station owners whose future license
applications may be rejected, and whose current licenses may be subject to revocation).
42. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
43. Id. at 138-39.
44. Id. at 152-53 (noting that compliance would require the modification of all
promotional materials, the destruction of printed stocks, and the replacement of supplies).
45. Id. at 148-49.
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decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration. 4 6 In determining the fitness factor, the Court emphasized
first that the disputed issue was "a purely legal one: whether the statute
was properly construed by the Commissioner to require the established
name of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is
employed," and second, that the regulations were considered a "final
agency action" under the APA.47 With respect to finding the regulation
at issue to be final, the Court relied on its "flexible view of finality" in
previous cases. 48 Finally, the Court considered the second factor of
hardship to the plaintiffs. The Court determined that there was sufficient
standing because the regulation "require[d] [the plaintiffs] to make
significant changes in their everyday business practices.
4 9
2. Broader Scope of Review, Less Deference to Agency Action
Not only has the Supreme Court upheld the general availability of
judicial review of most agency actions, it has also held agencies to a
stricter standard when conducting review of their actions to avoid
arbitrary determinations. 0 Under the APA, the Supreme Court has
recognized and sought to protect against three types of agency actions
deemed unlawful: (1) arbitrary and capricious abuses of discretion; (2)
unconstitutional actions; and (3) actions beyond an agency's statutory
authority." With respect to actions challenged as beyond an agency's
46. Id. at 149.
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that prior cases have interpreted
the finality element pragmatically). In an earlier case, an FCC rule asserting its intention
not to license certain stations was held to be a final agency action under the APA, even
though it was "a statement only of its intentions" and no license had yet been denied
under the rule. Id. at 149-50; see supra note 22 (providing the APA's definition of "rule").
48. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 150 (recognizing that the announcement of a policy not
to issue additional television licenses to applicants with seven licenses and the notice of a
statutory interpretation of the meaning of "agricultural commodities" had previously been
considered final agency actions) (citing United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192,
198 (1956); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40,45 (1956)).
49. Id. at 154.
50. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 235 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). Prior to the enactment of the APA, the Supreme Court
afforded respect to agency decisions, but weighed a variety of factors in determining the
degree of respect. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136, 140 (1944) (holding that
rulings by the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Administrator, as to when "waiting
time" constituted "working time," though not controlling, served as proper guidance for
the courts). Moreover, the Court noted that the absence of an adversarial trial in
formulating these rulings did not bar the rulings from some degree of respect. id. at 140
(referring to Treasury decisions and regulations as examples of nonadversarial rulings
entitled to respect). The weight that courts would give to non-controlling rulings
depended upon factors including: "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
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delegated authority, courts initially cautioned against upholding such
actions. 2
In Morton v. Ruiz,53 for example, the Supreme Court demonstrated its
unwillingness to uphold agency actions that the Court deemed arbitrary. 4
The respondents, who were members of an Indian tribe and lived near,
but not on a reservation, sought general assistance benefits under the
Snyder Act. When the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) denied
assistance, the respondents challenged the action as arbitrary under
section 706 of the APA. 6 The Court agreed, reasoning that this action
was inconsistent with the BIA's usual practice of awarding assistance to
members of an Indian tribe who lived "near" a reservation, as well as
"on" a reservation 7
Not only did the Morton Court grant judicial review, but in rejecting
the BIA's limitation on providing general assistance benefits, the Court
placed emphasis on the agency's inconsistency. Because the agency's
prior interpretation of "on a reservation" had included "near" a
reservation, the Court gave greater weight to this interpretation than to
the express language in the Snyder Act.5 9 The Court added that it was
not necessarily ultra vires for the agency to limit assistance in this
manner, but that in doing so, "the agency must, at a minimum, let the
standard be generally known so as to assure that it is being applied
consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of
arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries."6 Ultimately, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id.
52. See Morton, 415 U.S. at 237; Mast Indus. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 222
(1984) (noting that no act of Congress has been set aside as an unconstitutional delegation
of authority since 1935).
53. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
54. Id. at 237.
55. Id. at 204.
56. Id. at 205, 233; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.
57. Morton, 415 U.S. at 229.
58. Id. at 237. An agency has a responsibility to act consistently, as well as to
implement procedures mandated by law. Id. at 232 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764
(1969) (plurality opinion); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Brannan v.
Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952)). The Supreme Court has recognized that the deference
afforded to an agency's interpretation is contingent on "its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also N. Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423
U.S. 12, 14 (1975) (per curiam) (finding that Atomic Energy Commission's interpretation
of its own regulations was controlling where the interpretation was "supported by the
wording of the regulations and.., consistent with prior agency decisions").
59. Morton, 415 U.S. at 233.
60. Id. at 231.
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Court concluded that the BIA's ad hoc, unpublished determination
represented the type of arbitrary rulemaking the APA sought to avoid.6,
In furtherance of its goal to deter arbitrary agency action, the Supreme
Court committed itself to ensuring agency adherance to the Act's
rulemaking provisions.62  NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. demonstrated
this commitment.63
In Wyman-Gordon Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a rule
requiring an employer to provide lists of eligible employee voters to
unions.64 The rule was promulgated by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) through an internal adjudication process in lieu of APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.6  The Court noted that
the APA required, at a minimum, publication of both the proposed and
adopted versions of the rule in the Federal Register, and an opportunity
for interested parties to be heard prior to adoption. 66 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the NLRB's self-created adjudicatory proceedings
"f[ell] short of the substance of the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.,
67
B. The Supreme Court Abandons a Presumption of Review and
Embraces Agency Deference
Both the presumption of availability of judicial review and the broad
scope applied in that review have been largely abandoned. 8 Beginning
as early as the 1970s, the Supreme Court restricted a petitioner's standing
61. Id. at 233-34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 21-23 (1946); S. REP. No. 79-752, at
12-13 (1945)). Further, section 552(a)(1) of the APA states in pertinent part: "Each
agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance
of the public ... substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2000). Additionally, the APA provides
that absent "actual and timely notice," a person may not "be adversely affected by ... a
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published." Id.
62. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 764. Such provisions were "designed to assure
fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application." Id. (citing H.R. REP.
No. 79-1980, at 21-26; S. REP. No. 79-752, at 13-16).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 763-64.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 764 (noting that an agency may not devise its own rulemaking procedures).
67. Id. at 764-65 (citing as evidence the fact that the rule was not published in the
Federal Register, and that not all interested parties were given notice of the proceedings
held, thus averting the purpose of the rulemaking procedures to allow all interested parties
to participate in the rulemaking process).
68. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1980); see also Ohio
Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 726 (1998); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 506 (1994); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195-99 (1993).
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to challenge an agency action, afforded unprecedented deference to
agencies, and expanded the application of exceptions under the APA.69
1. Limited Availability of Judicial Review
The modern trend in Supreme Court decisions has been to apply the
Abbott Laboratories test,70 but ultimately conclude that the absence of a
final agency action precludes judicial review.71  The Court has
accomplished this by applying a stricter definition of "finality" in finding
71
an agency action ripe for review.
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co.,73 for example, the Supreme Court held
that the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
regarding a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) was
not subject to judicial review prior to completion of a pending
administrative adjudication. 4 The Court reasoned that the FTC's action
was not a "final agency action" under section 10(c) of the APA.75 The
Court applied the twofold test promulgated in Abbott Laboratories,
comparing the FTC's issuance in this case with the Abbott Laboratories
Court's interpretation that required manufacturers to place labels on
drug products. 6 The Court held that the FTC's issuance "ha[d] no legal
69. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
70. See supra Part I.A.1.
71. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 735-36; Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 238-39
(1980). But see Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1986)
(addressing whether judicial review is precluded by statute, discussing whether a final
agency action exists, and emphasizing that statutes "rarely ... withhold judicial review").
72. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 239-41 (concluding that the action at issue did not
constitute a "definitive statement of position").
73. 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
74. Id. at 234, 238. Major oil companies challenged the complaint on the basis that it
allegedly lacked the requisite "reason to believe" that a violation of the FTCA had
occurred. Id. at 234.
75. id. at 238.
76. Id. at 242. The Court distinguished this case from Abbott Laboratories,
explaining:
In Abbott Laboratories, for example, the publication of certain regulations by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs was held to be final agency action subject to
judicial review in an action for declaratory judgment brought prior to any
Government action for enforcement. The regulations required manufacturers of
prescription drugs to print certain information on drug labels and
advertisements. The regulations were "definitive" statements of the
Commission's position, and had a "direct and immediate ... effect on the day-to-
day business" of the complaining parties. They had "the status of law" and
"immediate compliance with their terms was expected." In addition, the
question presented by the challenge to the regulations was a "legal issue ... fit
for judicial resolution." Finally, because the parties seeking the declaratory
judgment represented almost all the parties affected by the regulations, "a pre-
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force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in Abbott
Laboratories, nor any comparable effect upon ... daily business. 77
In a more recent case, Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club,78 the
Supreme Court held that an environmental group's challenge of the
United States Forest Service's land resource management plan that
allegedly permitted excessive logging was not ripe for judicial review. 9
The Court reasoned that although the plan made logging and clear-
cutting more likely, federal statutes and Forest Service regulations
required several steps before review of an action was authorized.
so
Applying the Abbott Laboratories test,"' the Court found that the
environmental groups could not point to any hardship of a strictly legal
kind, or one that had a practical effect on the trees that environmental
groups aimed to protect.82 Therefore, the Court held that the issue wasnot ripe for review."
2. Narrowing the Scope of Review
In addition to limiting the availability of judicial review of agency
actions, the Supreme Court also began to afford those actions greater
deference. In a landmark decision, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,4 the Court afforded an unprecedented
enforcement challenge . . . [was] calculated to speed enforcement" of the
relevant Act.
Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
77. Id. at 242. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the only effect of the FTC's
complaint was the initiation of adjudication proceedings. Id. The only burden imposed on
the oil companies was that they had to respond to the complaint. Id. In addition, the
Court noted that FTC regulations, in conjunction with the APA, required proceedings in
which the respondent had the opportunity to rebut the FFC's complaint by presenting
evidence before an administrative law judge and then appealing any adverse ruling to the
FTC. Id. at 241.
78. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
79. Id. at 728.
80. Id. at 729-30. The National Forest Management Act required the Forest Service
to choose a site and logging method, ensure a project's consistency with its plan, afford
interested parties notice and opportunity for comment, perform an environmental
assessment, and implement a final determination to allow logging, which would be
appealable in administrative and court proceedings. Id.
81. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
82. Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 733-34 (noting that the Forest Service's plan did
not "give anyone a legal right to cut trees ... [or] abolish anyone's legal authority to object
to trees being cut"). Further, the environmental group failed to present an argument in
the lower courts demonstrating any manner in which the plan forced it "to modify its
behavior... to avoid future adverse consequences." Id.
83. id. at 739.
84. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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level of deference to an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
decision to treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
site as within a single bubble.85 The Court applied a two-part test: (1) if
Congress' express intent was clear as to the construction of the enabling
statute, the Court must carry out Congress' express intent; (2) if
Congress' intent was ambiguous, the Court must give deference to an
agency's interpretation of the statute, provided it is a "reasonable"
816interpretation . Providing some clarification as to what constitutes a
reasonable interpretation, the Court emphasized that if "Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation."' Further, "[s]uch legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. ' ' 8 Finding that Congress expressly intended to be
silent on the issue, the Court applied the second part of its test. The
Court held that the EPA's interpretation, that the statutory term
"stationary source" covered an entire industry plant, was permissible. 9
Chevron, Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,90 and Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin9' also demonstrated the Court's pattern
of affording substantial deference to an agency's interpretation.
Although the Court declined to accept an agency's interpretation in
Norfolk Southern Railway Co., the key distinguishing factor in
overcoming this deference was that the Court itself had previously
interpreted the statute in a manner inconsistent with the agency's
interpretation .92
In Thomas Jefferson University, the petitioner challenged the Secretary
of Health and Human Services' interpretation that a Medicare
reimbursement provision excluded certain educational expenditures.93
The Court upheld the Secretary's interpretation, stating that an
"agency's interpretation must be given 'controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent. ,,14 The Court did acknowledge that
85. Id. at 840, 866.
86. Id. at 842-44. An agency's interpretation of a statute does not have to be the only
permissible construction or the same interpretation that the Court would have reached.
Id. at 843 n.11.
87. Id. at 843-44.
88. Id. at 844.
89. Id. at 845-46, 866.
90. 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
91. 529 U.S. 344 (2000).
92. Id. at 356; infra note 100.
93. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 506.
94. Id. at 512 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945)).
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conflicting interpretations are "entitled to considerably less deference,"9'
but found the petitioner's claim in this regard to be unsubstantiated. 9
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. demonstrated how an agency's
inconsistency may cause its acts to be set aside as arbitrary and
capricious. 97 Unlike in Chevron and Thomas Jefferson University, the
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Court rejected the Federal Highway
Administration's interpretation of a regulation concerning warning
devices for railroad crossings.' The Court acknowledged that although
''an agency's construction of its own regulations is [ordinarily] entitled to
substantial deference," 99 such deference does not apply if the agency's
interpretation is inconsistent with the express text of the statute, and with
a prior interpretation of the statute adopted by the Court.' 0
95. Id. at 515 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446, n.30 (1987)).
96. See id. at 515-16 (rejecting the petitioner's reference to a 1978 letter discussing
various categories of educational expenses but failing to address redistribution). It is
noteworthy that this alleged inconsistent letter is distinguishable from the inconsistent
actions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Morton v. Ruiz. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 233 (1974). In Thomas Jefferson University, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' prior letter could not be inconsistent with the agency's interpretation concerning
redistribution because the letter did not address the matter of redistribution at all.
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 505, 515. To the contrary, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' past actions of affording monetary assistance to native Indians living "near" a
reservation were inconsistent with the Bureau's interpretation. Morton, 415 U.S. at 233.
97. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 529 U.S. at 352-59.
98. Id. at 355-56. The Administration's view was that the regulation "comprise[d]
two distinct programs-the 'minimum protection' program and the 'priority' or 'hazard'
program." Id. at 355.
99. Id. at 356 (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)).
100. Id. (emphasizing that the doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to a prior
determination by the Court of "a statute's clear meaning [and that any] later
interpretation of the statute" is evaluated based on that prior determination). In addition
to granting greater deference to agency actions, the Supreme Court was reluctant to
interpret legislation granting agency authority as requiring formal rulemaking, and
eventually, notice-and-comment procedures. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (adopting the position that courts
may not impose additional procedural requirements on agencies); United States v. Fla. E.
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240-42 (1973) (holding that a statutory requirement for a
"hearing" did not require formal adjudicative proceedings under the APA, but would be
satisfied by the APA's notice-and-comment procedures and informal rulemaking
proceedings); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1972)
(refusing to interpret a statutory requirement for a "hearing" as invoking formal
rulemaking procedures under the APA). In one prior case, the Supreme Court held that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services was not "required to abide by the familiar
notice-and-comment rule making provisions" of the APA prior to reallocating its
resources because such a decision was exempt as a "'general statement[] of policy."'
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195-97 (1993) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988)). The
Court concluded that the APA's exemption for general statements of policy most certainly
included an "announcement ... discontinu[ing] a discretionary allocation of unrestricted
funds from a lump-sum appropriation." Id. at 197. The Court relied on its decision in
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C. The "Sphere of International Trade": Broad Availability of Review
Offset by a Limited Scope of Review
Although willing to afford judicial review to a broad spectrum of
agency actions, the Federal Circuit and the CIT have assumed a
markedly deferential posture when reviewing agency actions with respect
to international trade, specifically those undertaken by CITA. ' The
courts generally construe agency actions concerning international trade
to be within the ambit of the President's foreign affairs authority; thus,
they are subject to an assumption of broad delegated authority exempt
from APA rulemaking procedures. 10 2  Courts usually self-impose
limitations when reviewing these matters on the issue of whether the
President or his designated agencies have acted beyond their delegated
power, i.e., whether their actions are ultra vires.' °3 Three cases, Mast
Industries, Inc. v. Regan,4 American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers-
Textile & Apparel Group v. United States (Am. Ass'n of Exporters II), '0
and Fieldston Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 0' 6 demonstrate this
combination of broad availability of review and restrictive scope of
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), in which the
Secretary of Transportation's decision to "allow the expenditure of federal funds to build
[a highway] through [a public park] was plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking function."
Id. at 414. The Supreme Court previously defined "general statements of policy" as
"statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which
the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979); see also Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 199 (distinguishing the requirement
in Morton v. Ruiz that a provision restricting eligibility for Indian assistance be published
in the Federal Register because the Bureau's own regulations in Morton required such
publication). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that although Chevron deference is
inapplicable to statements of policy that are not bound by notice-and-comment
procedures, such actions may be eligible for Skidmore respect, depending on their
persuasiveness. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); supra notes 51, 58.
101. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1984). With
respect to international trade, "congressional authorizations of presidential power should
be given a broad construction and not hemmed in or cabined, cribbed, confined by anxious
judicial blinders." Id. (quoting S. P.R. Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d
622, 632 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See Mast Indus. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 232-33 (1984).
103. See Am. Ass'n of Exps. and Imps.-Textile & Apparel Group v. United States
(Am. Ass'n of Exporters 1), 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 79, 86-87 (1984) (explaining that "[t]he only
question . . . remain[ing] is whether the President's actions (through the CITA) were
permissible pursuant to section 204 . . . . [because] Section 204 grants extraordinary
discretion to the President .... [h]e may negotiate 'whenever he determines such action
appropriate"' (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982))), affd, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
104. 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214 (1984).
105. 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
106. 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1181 (1995).
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review. Generally, in international trade cases, courts will review an• 107
agency action, but are unlikely to conclude that the action is unlawful.
1. Flexible Ripeness for Review Standard
In Mast Industries, the CIT found that importers and retailers of textile
products had standing to bring an action against the United States
Customs Service (Customs) challenging interim regulations that
amended country of origin requirements for textiles imported subject to
quotas under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA).0° Without specifically
referencing the Abbott Laboratories test for determining whether
requisite agency action was final, the CIT relied on the adverse practical
effect of restricting textile imports to determine that the importers were
sufficiently aggrieved.'09 The CIT emphasized the importers' direct
interest because of "contractual relationships based upon the former
regulations."" 0 Further, the CIT reasoned that a sufficient adverse effect
existed in that "'business relationships . . . could be disrupted and
adversely affected by the quotas."'' .
The Federal Circuit affirmed this reasoning in Am. Ass'n of Exporters
H, holding that trade associations representing importers of textile and
apparel products had sufficient standing to challenge CITA's unilateral
implementation of quotas because there was no market disruption.'
The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court that textile importers
were entities having a "direct interest in purchasing the textile and
apparel products ... involved (and with contractual relationships based
thereon).""3
107. See, e.g., Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 220-21,232-33; Am. Ass'n of Exporters I,
7 Ct. Int'l Trade at 86-88.
108. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 216-17, 221; see also MFA, supra note 1. The
MFA was the original textile agreement providing a basis on which limitations could be
placed on textile imports, negotiated pursuant to section 204 of the Agricultural Act of
1956, and was succeeded by the ATC. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 217 n.2.
109. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 221 (finding that the importers had standing due
to their "direct interest in purchasing textile products" and the fact that they had already
"entered into contractual relationships").
110. Id.
111. Id. (omission in original) (quoting U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 3 Ct.
Int'l Trade 196, 202 (1982)). The CIT did not require that the effect be legal in the sense
that it have the force of law, but rather in the sense that a legal contractual interest was
affected. See id.
112. Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Group v. United States (Am.
Ass'n of Exporters 11), 751 F.2d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that the plaintiffs
had standing due to the injury they would endure as a result of the challenged quantitative
restrictions).
113. Id. The action taken by CITA in Am. Ass'n Of Exporters 11-the implementation
of quotas on textile imports-constitutes a more final action than the interim regulations
[Vol. 55:11691186
The Impact of Inconsistent Agency Procedures
Ten years later, the CIT applied the same rationale in Fieldston
Clothes, Inc. to determine that importers of a category of wool garments
had standing to challenge CITA's import restrictions of that category
pursuant to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC),"4 and that
such an import restriction constituted a final agency action ripe for
review.5 The CIT found that Fieldston Clothes, Inc. was sufficiently
adversely affected by a restriction inhibiting the entry of their wool
garments into the United States.'
1 6
2. Limited Scope of Review
The leading case governing the restricted scope of review in the sphere
of international trade, Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States,"7 established
that "the Executive's decisions .. .are reviewable only to determine
whether the President's action falls within his delegated authority,
whether the statutory language has been properly construed, and
whether the President's action conforms with the relevant procedural
requirements."18 In Mast Industries, the CIT applied this standard to
reject the importers' contention that CITA's interim regulations violated
section 706(2)(A) of the APA." 9 The CIT found that CITA's authority
to issue such regulations was properly delegated under section 204 of the
Agricultural Act. 20  The CIT did not consider whether the interim
regulations promulgated by CITA were arbitrary within the meaning of
section 706(2)(A).'2 '
Additionally, the Mast Industries court found that Customs was
exempt from the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA under both
the general statement of policy and the foreign affairs exemptions in 5
in Mast Industries, which had not come into effect and were not applicable to existing
contractual purchases. See Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 217.
114. Fieldston Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1181, 1185-86 (1995).
115. Id. (determining that the plaintiff was a "party adversely affected by CITA's
import restrictions as ... wool garment imports by Fieldston are now unable to enter the
United States"); see also supra note 22.
116. Fieldston Clothes, Inc., 19 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1186.
117. 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 795.
119. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224-25.
120. Id. at 224. The CIT declined to even consider whether the regulations were
contradictory to the terms of the MFA, reasoning that the MFA is not law governed by
section 706 of the APA because it is an international agreement that creates no legal rights
for the importers. Id. at 224-25. Section 706(2)(A) specifically provides that a court shall
"set aside agency action ... found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
121. See Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224-25; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) and § 553 (b)(A).' z Under the foreign affairs
exemption, an agency may be exempt from notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedure "to the extent that there is involved a military or
foreign affairs function of the United States."'23 The court noted that
there is no clear framework for determining when to invoke the foreign
affairs function.124 Moreover, the court emphasized that the exception
''cannot apply to functions merely because they have impact beyond the
borders of the United States ... it is the function of the regulations that is
determinative, and not the source of the authority invoked.' 25 The court
was not willing to accept that any action "remotely relating to foreign
affairs" 126 is exempt from APA rulemaking provisions because this would
effectively render all Customs regulations of textiles under section 204
exempt, "even if entirely domestic in impact., 127 Nevertheless, the court
ultimately concluded that the "negotiation of agreements" under section
204 was exempt in that it "'clearly and directly "involve[s] a" foreign
affairs function." 2 8
Similarly, in Am. Ass'n of Exporters H, the Federal Circuit held that
CITA did not exceed its statutory authority under section 204 of the
Agricultural Act in implementing textile quotas. 29 The court also held
that CITA was exempt from notice-and-comment proceedings under the
foreign affairs exemption.3 Further, the court found that inquiries into
CITA's reasoning were beyond proper judicial review. 3 '
In Fieldston Clothes, Inc., the CIT examined whether CITA's action of
imposing import quotas governed by the ATC was beyond the scope of
122. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 228-30; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1), (b)(A).
Further, "a rule is a general statement [of policy] when it 'does not establish a 'binding
norm' [and is not] finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed."'
Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 228 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n,
506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
124. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 229-30.
125. Id. at 230.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 231.
128. Id. at 232.
129. Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Group v. United States (Am.
Ass'n of Exporters 11), 751 F.2d 1239, 1246-48 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 1249 (reasoning that prior disclosure of CITA's intentions to impose quotas
would "'provoke definitely undesirable international consequences"' (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 69-1980, at 23 (1946))).
131. Id. at 1248 (concluding that "'[o]nce it is determined, as we have just done, that
the President's exercise of his authority ... was within his constitutionally delegated power
.... [t]he President's findings of fact and the motivations for his actions are not subject to
review"' (first omission in original) (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744
F.2d 787, 795-96 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
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the President's authority under section 204.132 The plaintiff, Fieldston,
submitted comments to CITA in response to CITA's notice, arguing in
part that the proposed quota limits at issue were "inconsistent with the
United States' obligations under the ATC.', 3 3 The CIT limited the scope
of review to the issue of whether CITA's actions were ultra vires,
refusing to consider whether CITA's actions were inconsistent with its
own prior procedures or the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the
ATC. 3 4 The CIT further declined to address Fieldston's objections to
the procedural implementation of the ATC by CITA. 3 5  The CIT
considered the relevant issue to be "whether the imposition of the import
quota" being challenged was "relevant to the enforcement of some
existing textile agreement"-the test for determining whether CITA's
actions were ultra vires.16  The CIT ultimately concluded that CITA
acted within its authority.'37
132. Fieldston Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1181, 1182-84 (1995)
(representing the only court case to address CITA's actions undertaken with respect to the
ATC).
133. Id. at 1183-84. The plaintiff also argued that CITA's interpretation of section 204
of the Agricultural Act was incorrect; the plaintiff asserted that the Act only applied to
bilateral agreements, not multilateral agreements like the ATC. Id. at 1187. The court
rejected this argument, finding section 204 and its applicability to multilateral agreements
sufficiently clear. Id.
134. Id. at 1184-85 ("'[11t is now well established ...that the exercise of broad
discretionary authority delegated by Congress to the President in the sphere of
international trade ... is reviewable ... only to determine whether the President's action
falls within his delegated authority [and] whether the statutory language has been properly
construed."' (alteration and first omission in original) (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v.
United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 1, 11 (1983), affd, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
135. Id. at 1184. The CIT limited its review in view of 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) which, in
pertinent part, provides:
No person other than the United States -
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement,
or
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any
action or inaction by any department, agency or other instrumentality of the
United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground
that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such agreement.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (2000).
136. Fieldston Clothes, Inc., 19 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1188. The court recognized that,
contrary to Fieldston's contention, the ATC qualifies as an agreement limiting export of
textiles within the meaning of section 204. See id.
137. Id.
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II. U.S. ASS'N OF IMPORTERS OF TEXTILES & APPAREL V. UNITED
STATES: AGENCY DEFERENCE PREVAILS DESPITE INCONSISTENCY
Facing the elimination of all quotas on imported textile and clothing
products manufactured in WTO member countries, and relying on
textile-specific safeguard measures set forth in the WTO's Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of China (Working Report), CITA
departed from its own previously published and practiced procedures,
which required specific information that demonstrated actual market
disruption in the past, and in September 2004, announced that it would
allow safeguard petitions based solely on a mere threat. 38 From October
2004 to December 2004, CITA requested public comments on twelve
petitions for safeguards based solely on a threat of market disruption. 39
In response, the U.S.-ITA commenced an action before the CIT on
December 1, 2004, seeking an injunction against CITA that would
prevent it from considering threat-based petitions. In support of its
action, the U.S.-ITA argued that U.S. textile and apparel importers had
conducted their business operations in reliance on CITA's previously
published procedures for considering petitions, thus they would be
disrupted and irreparably harmed by the change."
The CIT granted U.S.-ITA's motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that U.S.-ITA raised substantial questions concerning the
propriety of CITA's acceptance of petitions based on a threat of market
disruption,14 1 that the balance of hardships favored an injunction againstsuch " 142such actions, and that issuance of an injunction would serve the public
138. Compare U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n
of Importers 1), 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (."'E]xisting U.S.
regulations would allow safeguards based on threat of a possible surge in imports, rather
than an actual surge."' (quoting Aldonas Insists China Textile Regs Can Handle Import
Threat Cases, CHINA TRADE EXTRA, Sept. 3, 2004)), and International Trade: Aldonas
Green Lights Preemptive Textile Petitions Based on Disruption Threat, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA), Sept. 7, 2004, at A-7, with China Textile Safeguard Procedures, supra
note 7, at 27,787, and Working Report, supra note 5, para. 242, and China Textile
Safeguards to Focus on Market Disruption, supra note 17 (publishing a statement from a
U.S. trade official that China textile-specific safeguard regulations were "intended for
cases of actual market disruption").
139. See 69 Fed. Reg. 77,998 (Dec. 29, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 77,232 (Dec. 27, 2004); 69
Fed. Reg. 75,516 (Dec. 17, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 71,781 (Dec. 10, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 70,661
(Dec. 7, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 68,133 (Nov. 23, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 64,915 (Nov. 9, 2004); 69
Fed. Reg. 64,914 (Nov. 9, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 64,913 (Nov. 9, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 64,912
(Nov. 9, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 64,911 (Nov. 9, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 64,034 (Nov. 3, 2004).
140. U.S. Ass'n of Importers 1, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47.
141. Id. at 1350.
142. Id. at 1349.
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interest.14 The government appealed the CIT's ruling to the Federal
Circuit, which reversed the lower court's ruling as an abuse of
discretion.'"
In its decision, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court clearly
erred in both its legal analysis and fact-finding, and reversed the CIT's
decision.' 45 In his opinion, Judge Michel first addressed whether U.S.-
ITA had a complaint ripe for judicial review, and then evaluated each of
U.S.-ITA's four claims to determine whether a "fair chance of success on
the merits" existed. 46  The four claims presented were: (1) CITA's
reinterpretation of prior published procedures to permit threat-based
requests for safeguards was arbitrary and capricious; (2) CITA violated
APA section 552(a)(1) by neglecting to publish the reinterpretation in
the Federal Register; (3) CITA violated rulemaking requirements under
APA section 553; and (4) CITA exceeded statutory authority under
section 204 of the Agricultural Act in its consideration of petitions for
textile-specific safeguard measures pursuant to the Working Report.
1 47
143. Id. at 1351. Judge Goldberg, writing the opinion for the lower court, reasoned
that to prevail on its motion for a preliminary injunction, the petitioner would need to
demonstrate: "(1) that it will be immediately and irreparably injured; (2) that the balance
of hardship on all the parties favors the petitioner; (3) that there is a likelihood of success
on the merits; and (4) that the public interest would be better served by the relief
requested." Id. at 1346.
Regarding the first factor, Judge Goldberg concluded that the plaintiff's forced
cancellation of orders in China and the possibility that failure to deliver goods on time
would impair business reputation constituted irreparable harm. Id. at 1347-49. With
regard to the second factor, the court determined that the balance of hardship favored a
preliminary injunction because irreparable harm would be caused to the petitioner,
whereas CITA could still administer textile-specific safeguards based on actual disruption.
Id. at 1349-50. Then considering the third factor, the CIT concluded that the plaintiff had
a likelihood of success on the merits in that it had "raise[d] serious substantial, difficult,
and doubtful questions that are the proper subject of litigation where it [wa]s clear that the
moving party [would] suffer substantially greater harm . . . than the non-moving party
would by its grant." Id. at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ugine-Savoie
Imphy v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1246, 1251 (2000)). Finally, regarding the fourth
factor, the lower court held that a preliminary injunction served the public interest of
ensuring that trade laws are properly administered. Id. at 1351.
144. U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of
Importers 11), 413 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
145. Id. Judge Michel highlighted an unresolved dispute as to whether U.S.-ITA was
required to show more than a fair chance of success on the merits in seeking an injunction
against the government, or whether a stricter standard should apply. Id. at 1347.
Ultimately, the court determined that U.S.-ITA did not even meet the burden of proving
the lesser standard, and noted that, even if this were the correct standard, the CIT
incorrectly applied it. Id.
146. See id. at 1347, 1350-53.
147. Id. at 1350-53.
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In its analysis, the court first found that the controversy was not ripe
for review because CITA's consideration of threat-based petitions did
not constitute a final agency action. 48  The court applied the Abbott
Laboratories test, comprised of: (1) the fitness of the issue at hand for
judicial review, and (2) the potential for hardship. 4 9 In applying this test,
the court compared CITA's action to the agency action imposing labeling
requirements on drug manufacturers in Abbott Laboratories, but
ultimately concluded that CITA's action more closely resembled the
"threshold determination" in Standard Oil, than it did a final agency
action.'50 The court reasoned that even if a challenge to the validity of
CITA's alleged reinterpretation was a "purely legal" question, it was not
fit for review because it was not a final agency action."' Applying the
second factor, the Federal Circuit concluded that U.S.-ITA's resulting
business uncertainty was not comparable to the hardship resulting from
the legal force of the drug labeling mandates in Abbott Laboratories.'
After determining that CITA's alleged reinterpretation was not a final
agency action ripe for judicial review, the court rejected U.S.-ITA's first
claim that CITA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reinterpreting its
prior published procedures to permit petitions based on a threat of
market disruption.' The court reasoned that CITA's interpretation of
published procedures coincided with the express language in the
Working Report.5 4 The court also declined to accept prior inconsistent
148. See id. at 1348-50.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1349.
151. Id. at 1349-50.
152. Id. at 1350.
153. Id. at 1350-52.
154. Id. at 1350-51. Instead of determining whether CITA's prior interpretation of the
terms set forth in paragraph 242 of the Working Report was consistent with its most recent
interpretation, the court conducted its own interpretation of the terms. See id. at 1351.
Ultimately, the court relied on the phrase "avoiding ... market disruption," to conclude
that the provision must have contemplated consideration of petitions based on threat. Id.
Specifically, the court reasoned:
The primary focus of the Association's argument is on the language from the
procedures- "due to market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly
development of trade in these products." The Association contends that this
language requires that data describing current market disruption be presented
before CITA can lawfully consider whether to request consultations with China.
The Association's argument is unpersuasive because it would require us to
read this language out of context. CITA's procedures and paragraph 242 both
follow the disputed language with a description of the stated purpose of the
paragraph 242 safeguard, which is "easing or avoiding such market disruption."
The word "avoiding" shows that current market disruption is not a prerequisite
for action under either the procedures or paragraph 242 because "such market
disruption" cannot be "avoid[ed]" if it has already occurred.
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statements made by CITA officials as formal or binding, finding that
these interpretations did not officially represent CITA's position."'
Given that the Federal Circuit found no actual reinterpretation, the
court quickly rejected U.S.-ITA's second and third contentions that
CITA violated APA's publication requirements under section 552 and
116formal rulemaking procedures under section 553 . Finally, the court
declined to decide the petitioner's final claim that CITA's actions in
implementing safeguards pursuant to the Working Report were ultra
vires.'57
III. DOES LIMITATION OF THE AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW DEPRIVE U.S.-ITA OF ANY RECOURSE AGAINST ARBITRARY
OR UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTIONS?
A. The Federal Circuit Incorrectly Restricted the Availability and Scope
of Judicial Review
The Federal Circuit in U.S. Ass'n of Importers II incorrectly applied
the Abbott Laboratories test, deviated from Federal Circuit and CIT
precedent for ripeness, and overlooked Morton v. Ruiz when it
considered the arbitrary nature of CITA's actions."5
First, the Federal Circuit failed to conduct a thorough analysis when it
applied the twofold Abbott Laboratories test, which requires a
consideration of the fitness of the issue for review and the potential
hardship to the claimant. 9 The court's method was entirely based on
analogy, relying too heavily on whether CITA's alleged reinterpretation
of its procedures for accepting petitions seemed to more closely resemble
the agency action in Abbott Laboratories or Standard Oil, without closely
examining the criteria that the Supreme Court relied upon to arrive at
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra note 5.
155. US. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1352.
156. Id. at 1353. Thus, the court avoided deciding whether CITA was exempt from
APA formal rulemaking procedural requirements under either the foreign affairs
exemption or the general statement of policy exemption. See supra notes 122-128 and
accompanying text (describing the interpretation that the Mast Industries court provided
these exceptions).
157. U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1353. The court noted that this was a
matter of first impression, but concluded that "mere novelty [was] insufficient to establish
a fair chance of prevailing." Id.
158. See supra notes 42-49, 52-60 and accompanying text; cf US. Ass'n of Importers H,
413 F.3d at 1348-50.
159. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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the two different outcomes in those two cases. 16° In its evaluation for
fitness for review in Abbott Laboratories, the Court acknowledged that
the issue to be reviewed was "a purely legal one: whether the statute was
properly construed by the Commissioner to require the established name
of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is employed."''
The Court noted that such an analysis still requires the agency to "justify
[its] regulation in factual terms.' ' 62 The Federal Circuit in U.S. Ass'n of
Importers II, however, disregarding the purely legal effect of CITA's
reinterpretation as insufficient alone, and failing to consider any factual
justifications, simply concluded that CITA's action was neither final nor
definitive, without defining either of these terms.16  In evaluating the
second factor, potential hardship, the court similarly disregarded the
adverse effect of CITA's alleged reinterpretation on the business
operations of U.S. importers, referring to it as merely "businesses'
perceived uncertainty."' 64
Second, U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11 strays from Federal Circuit and CIT
precedent that has strongly favored broad availability of judicial review.
The alleged reinterpretation at issue in U.S. Ass'n of Importers II closely
mirrors the Customs Service's revision of criteria for determining the
country of origin in Mast Industries, in that both represent a change in
procedures used to make final determinations.6 5 The Mast Industries
court found that the adverse effect on existing contractual relationships
and business operations constituted a direct interest on the part of
importers sufficient to invoke judicial review.' 66 If the Federal Circuit
had relied on this method of analysis, 6 1 the court likely would have given
160. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1348-50 (concluding that CITA's
reinterpretation of safeguard implementation procedures "is more analogous to the
'threshold determination' warranting further investigation in Standard Oil").
161. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); see also supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1348-50; supra notes 150-52 and
accompanying text. The Federal Circuit did not address CITA's efforts to justify the
factual terms of its actions, which the Court in Abbott Laboratories considered important
in evaluating the "purely legal" effect. See id.; Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
164. See id. at 1350.
165. See Mast Indus. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 221 (1984); supra notes 109-11
and accompanying text.
166. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 221.
167. The same consideration was given to the adverse effect on business' operations
and contractual relationships by the Federal Circuit in Am. Ass'n of Exporters 11 and by
the CIT in Fieldston Clothes, Inc. See Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel
Group v. United States (Am. Ass'n of Exporters 11), 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Fieldston Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1181, 1185-86 (1995).
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more significance to the adverse effect on U.S. importers' business
operations and found CITA's reinterpretation ripe for review.
Finally, the Federal Circuit fell short of conducting a complete analysis
of U.S.-ITA's chances of success on the merits. With respect to U.S.-
ITA's first claim-that CITA's alleged reinterpretation constituted an
arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion-the Federal Circuit failed to
consider the standard set forth in Morton v. Ruiz, and incorrectly applied
established precedent in international trade decisions. 69 The Federal
Circuit derived its own interpretation of CITA's published procedures
for evaluating textile-specific safeguard petitions, comparing the express
language to that of the textile-specific safeguard provisions in the
Working Report in conjunction with the corresponding provisions in the
Accession Agreement.7 Ultimately, the court concluded that CITA's
168. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers I, 413 F.3d at 1350-54.
169. Id. at 1350-53; see also supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1350-52. It is noteworthy that the Federal
Circuit did not address whether or not Chevron, or even Mead-Skidmore, deference is
warranted here. Id.; see also supra notes 51, 84-89, 100 and accompanying text. Instead of
applying the first part of the Chevron test to determine whether the enabling statute
(arguably section 204 of the Agriculture Act) is ambiguous, the court seems to have
examined and concluded that neither CITA's procedures nor the text of the Accession
Agreement or Working Report contain ambiguity. U.S. Ass'n of Importers I1, 413 F.3d at
1350-52. The Federal Circuit, nevertheless, continued to interpret the terms of the
Working Report as a court would under Chevron where Congress' express intent was
unclear in the enabling statute. See id.; supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. This
unusual method of deciphering the correct interpretation of the Working Report and
CITA procedures is a reflection of the fact that neither section 204 of the Agriculture Act,
nor any other statute enacted by Congress, contains implementing legislation
corresponding to paragraph 242 of the Working Report. See supra note 8 (discussing the
fact that the textile-specific safeguard measures implemented by CITA are the only type
of safeguards that are not implemented subsequent to extensive statutory procedures
outlined in the U.S. Trade Act of 1974). Thus, the court could not accurately have
concluded that the first step of Chevron was satisfied because this step requires Congress
to have specifically addressed the issue in question. See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text. Consequently, the court should have moved to the second inquiry
under Chevron, which would have forced the court to determine whether CITA's
interpretation was reasonably permissible. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text
(explaining that where Congress intended to be silent on the issue, the second part of the
Chevron test should be applied). In effect, this would have required the court to evaluate
whether the interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, because the court held that CITA never "reinterpreted" its procedures, it
evaluated CITA's initial published procedures as if they allowed for threat-based
decisions. U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1350-52. Thus, if the court had properly
addressed the appropriate degree of deference to afford CITA's alleged reinterpretation,
it would have done so as if it were an agency's interpretation via published notice-and-
comment procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Although notice-and-comment
procedures do not always warrant Chevron deference, they operate as evidence that
Chevron deference is appropriate. See supra notes 84-89, 100 and accompanying text. If
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procedures included consideration of threat-based petitions, and
complied with the express terms of the pertinent textile-specific
safeguard petitions.' The court then briefly addressed the effect of prior
published statements of CITA officials who expressed their intention not
to consider threat-based petitions, finding that the statements were not
the formal position of CITA, and therefore not binding.
17
1
The Federal Circuit's analysis in U.S. Ass'n of Importers II is faulty
when compared with the Supreme Court's analysis in Morton v. Ruiz.'
73
First, the Federal Circuit quickly reached the conclusion that the CITA
procedures expressly included petitions based on the threat of import174
surge. The court hastily concluded that no ambiguity existed when
express terms contained in both CITA's initial procedures and the
Working Report appeared to conflict, and when neither CITA nor the
pertinent provisions of the Report defined these terms. 75 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that the phrase "avoiding . . . market disruption'
76
clearly demonstrates that market disruption is not a prerequisite to
consideration of a petition for safeguard measures because market
disruption that is already occurring can no longer be avoided.
7 7
However, the same rationale could be applied to the phrase "due to
market disruption,"'' 78 which, if not a prerequisite to consideration of a
request, would likewise render that phrase erroneous. 79  Further, the
the court had considered the possibility that CITA's reinterpretation could be an informal
statement of policy change, as in Christensen, it may have concluded that the Mead-
Skidmore analysis was more appropriate to determine the degree of respect to which the
agency was entitled. See supra notes 51, 100. Under the Skidmore factors, the
inconsistency in prior practice and procedures would have weighed against providing
strong deference to CITA's actions. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Due to the evident ambiguity-evidenced by the very absence of implementing legislation
in section 204-whether the court applied Chevron or Mead-Skidmore analysis, it should
have determined, at the very least, if the reinterpretation was arbitrary under the second
part of the Chevron test. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
171. U.S. Ass'n of Importers II, 413 F.3d at 1352.
172. Id.
173. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235-37 (1974); supra notes 52-60.
174. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers II, 413 F.3d at 1351-52 (The court noted that "no
deference is required where ... the procedures themselves are clear.").
175. See supra notes 5, 7-8.
176. U.S. Ass'n of Importers II, 413 F.3d at 1351.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 1352; supra notes 5, 7-8. The Federal Circuit rejected U.S.-ITA's
arguments that certain data is required to demonstrate market disruption by focusing on
CITA's use of the term "should" versus the word "shall." See U.S. Ass'n of Importers II,
413 F.3d at 1352. CITA's published procedures do state that consideration of requests
shall be in accordance with "longstanding Committee practice in considering textile
actions." See supra note 7. Arguably, the Committee has established a longstanding
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Federal Circuit erred in its refusal to place emphasis on prior statements
of intent and prior implementation of procedures as evidence of CITA's
intent. '8 Conversely, the Morton Court gave greater weight to the prior
interpretation and implementation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its
allocation of assistance than it did to the express terms in the enabling
legislation itself."'
Moreover, the Federal Circuit neglected to reference any precedent
governing the scope of judicial review in cases involving international
trade. 82 If the court had applied the standard set forth in Florsheim Shoe
Co.,"' it would have decided whether CITA regulations, the China
Accession Agreement, or the Working Report constituted law under
section 706 of the APA prior to determining whether CITA had acted
contrary to any law.'8 It is likely that the court's consideration of
practice of accepting petitions based only on actual market disruption. See supra note 17.
Further, CITA's procedures expressly provide that "[a] request will only be considered if
the request includes ... specific information ... that the Chinese origin textile or apparel
product is ... threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in like or directly
competitive products." China Textile Safeguard Procedures, supra note 7, at 27,788
(emphasis added); see supra note 8. The prior U.S. definition of the terms "like or directly
competitive" under the Trade Act of 1974 governing all other safeguard measures (other
than textiles) is well-established. See supra note 8. If threat-based petitions were
evaluated under the Trade Act of 1974, they would be deemed inadequate for failing to
establish that the domestic producer seeking protection produces a "like or directly
competitive product" to the foreign product causing or threatening to cause market
disruption. Id. Because CITA's published procedures similarly require data to
demonstrate that the product of concern is a "like or directly competitive" product, even
threat-based petitions would need to provide data sufficient to satisfy this established
definition. Cf Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also supra note 8.
180. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers 1I, 413 F.3d at 1352; supra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text.
181. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974); supra notes 52-60 and accompanying
text. The Morton Court specifically reasoned:
Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to
follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required. The BIA, by its
Manual, has declared that all directives that "inform the public of privileges and
benefits available" and of "eligibility requirements" are among those to be
published. The requirement that, in order to receive general assistance, an
Indian must reside directly "on" a reservation is clearly an important substantive
policy that fits within this class of directives. Before the BIA may extinguish the
entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a
minimum, with its own internal procedures.
Morton, 415 U.S. at 235 (citations omitted).
182. See U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11, 413 F.3d at 1350-52.
183. See Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (1984).
184. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Mast Indus. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 224 (1984).
Because there is no legislation implementing procedures for the enforcement of textile-
specific safeguards as there are for other agency safeguards, CITA's regulations can only
be evaluated as to whether they are ultra vires under section 204 of the Agricultural Act.
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whether CITA's actions were arbitrary would have been limited to
whether CITA failed to comply with procedural requirements because
precedent indicates that there will be no review of an agency's reasoning
or fact-finding in the sphere of international trade."'5 Furthermore,
CITA's obligation to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under the APA would likely have hinged on whether the
• 186
court applied the APA's foreign affairs function exemption.
Precedent in international trade cases strongly suggests that the court
would have invoked the foreign affairs function exemption to excuse
CITA's disregard for APA rulemaking requirements. 187 The crux of the
recognition of the foreign affairs exemption in international trade cases is
that if an agency action is sufficiently final to be reviewable, it most likely
impacts a foreign interested party and falls under the exemption.18 The
inequitable result is that agency actions ripe for judicial review are not
reviewable for arbitrariness.' 9
However, an evaluation of the applicability of the foreign affairs
exemption under Mast Industries might have yielded a result favoring
U.S. textile importers. The court in Mast Industries refused to accept
that any action "even ... remotely relating to foreign affairs"'"9 is exempt
from APA rulemaking provisions because this would effectively render
all agency actions under section 204 of the Agriculture Act exempt-
even those "entirely domestic in impact."'' 9 CITA's internal change in
domestic procedures arguably constitutes an action "entirely domestic in
impact," such that the court could have refused to exempt CITA from
compliance with APA notice-and-comment procedures under the foreign
affairs exemption.192
See supra note 8. The Federal Circuit, however, declined to address the question of
whether the Working Report even meets the definition of a textile agreement under that
Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (2000); supra note 182 and accompanying text.
185. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224.
186. See id. at 229-30; supra notes 122-28.
187. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
188. See Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Group (Am. Ass'n of
Exporters 11), 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985); supra notes 122-28 and accompanying
text. In both Am. Ass'n of Exporters If and Mast Industries, the court found the agency
action in question to be ripe for review, but ultimately held the agency was exempt from
APA requirements under the foreign affairs exemption. See Am. Ass'n of Exporters II,
751 F.2d at 1246, 1249; Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 221, 232.
.189. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
190. Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 230.
191. Id. at 231; see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text (emphasizing that it is
the function, and not the source, of the authority granted to an agency that determines the
applicability of the foreign affairs exemption).
192. See Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 231-32.
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Regardless, even if the court had invoked the exemption, it would still
have been required to review whether CITA exceeded its delegated
authority under section 204 of the Agriculture Act, an issue untouched
by the Federal Circuit in U.S. Ass'n of Importers 11.193
An equitable approach would have been to review CITA's
reinterpretation as a final agency action, and either rely on the Morton
decision or expand on the dicta in Mast Industries to force APA
compliance and protect U.S. importers from arbitrary, ad hoc
determinations. 194  The Federal Circuit, however, opted for a less
equitable approach that effectively afforded CITA unprecedented
authority and broad discretion to alter procedures for implementing
textile-specific safeguard measures.195
B. The Federal Circuit Decision Will Continue to Cause Irreparable
Harm to U.S. Importers of Textile and Apparel Products
U.S. Ass'n of Importers H continues to cause irreparable harm to U.S.
importers of textile and apparel products in the form of strained business
operations and uncertain contractual relationships resulting from
unpredictability in the law governing textile-specific safeguards. 96 Since
the Federal Circuit's June 2005 ruling, CITA has implemented quotas as
a result of its consideration of threat-based petitions that restrict a
193. See U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States (U.S. Ass'n of
Importers 11), 413 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mast Indus., 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224-25;
supra note 185.
194. See supra notes 52-60, 122-28 and accompanying text.
195. See Hitt, supra note 8 (quoting Dan Ikenson, trade policy specialist at the CATO
Institute, who likened CITA's procedures to a "'kangaroo court,"' and opined that "'to
expect objectivity ... is expecting something miraculous"' (omission in original)).
196. Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Industry Officials Say United States and China Have
Tentative Textile Agreement, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 5, 2005 (quoting Laura E. Jones, U.S.-
ITA's Executive Director, who noted that "[M]any of the quotas imposed ... filled up so
quickly this year that retailers were left scrambling to find alternate sources of supply").
In May 2005, following the Federal Circuit's decision, CITA announced-three months
ahead of schedule-its intention to impose additional safeguards quotas, hindering the
business operations of "U.S. retailers and importers who were counting on buying
products from China." Hitt, supra note 8; see also Evan Clark & Kristi Ellis, Let's Make A
Trade Deal: U.S.-China Sign Accord To Limit Surging Imports, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY,
Nov. 9, 2005, at 12, available at http://www.wwd.com/search/article/102485?
query= %26%23034%3Btrade+deal%26%23034%3B (quoting China's Minister of
Commerce, "'The U.S. is, of course, facing pressures from employment of hundreds of
thousands of people, but in China we are facing the employment of around 20 million
people."'); He Qinglain, The China-U.S. Trade Conflict: Just a Beginning, CHINASCOPE,
July 30, 2005, at 31, available at http://www.chinascope.org/july05/economy.pdf ("To the
Chinese government, the repeated levying of quota limitations on Chinese textiles by the
United States and the European Union are simply hostile acts that totally ignore the
Chinese government's kind gesture of self-imposed export tariffs on textiles.").
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number of categories of textile imports. 97 Because U.S. importers enter
into contracts for the purchase of textile imports months before
shipment, many of them, particularly those operating small businesses,
have suffered financial loss from merchandise barred from entry into the
United States.'98
Moreover, CITA's change in procedures has angered Chinese officials,
causing strain on business relationships between U.S. importers and
Chinese exporters and a general distrust of the United States
administration.'9  Despite the Federal Circuit's finding that CITA
procedures expressly include consideration of threat-based petitions for
textile-specific safeguards, it is clear that Chinese officials did not intend
to enter into an agreement permitting such consideration.2 ° The United
States' willingness to negotiate with China, and its concession to exercise
restraint in considering future petitions for safeguards under the recently
signed U.S.-China Textile Agreement, support the conclusion that
197. See William R. Hawkins, Chinese Textiles Herald Future Tensions with U.S.,
CHINA BRIEF (Jamestown Found., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org
/images/pdflcb_005 020.pdf. CITA imposed safeguards against Chinese imports of
"cotton trousers, man-made fiber trousers, cotton shirts, man-made fiber shirts, men's and
boys' cotton and man-made fiber woven shirts, cotton and man-made fiber underwear,
socks, and combed cotton yarn." Id.
198. Crutsinger, supra note 196; see also Mei Fong & Greg Hitt, U.S., China Agree to
3-Year Deal on Textile Trade, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.online.wsj.comlarticle print/SB113120685754989365.html (discussing how
safeguard quotas imposed in 2005 made "apparel sourcing from China a risky business for
U.S. retailers").
199. China Protests Against Perceived U.S. 'Misuse' of WTO Rules, EMERGING
TEXTILES.COM, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.emergingtextiles.com/?q=art&s=050804
Atrad&r=quota-crisis&n=61 [hereinafter China Protests]; see also VIVIAN C. JONES,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. RL32621, SAFEGUARDS ON TEXTILE AND APPAREL
IMPORTS FROM CHINA 9-10 (2005), available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/
RL32168.pdf (noting that "Chinese trade officials strongly object to any use of
safeguards"). Following CITA's implementation of safeguards in May 2005, Chinese
officials stated "'the U.S. administration's decision to request negotiations regardless of
China's strong opposition runs against WTO principles on free trade, transparency, and
nondiscrimination."' Id. at 9. Commenting on threat-based safeguards, China opined:
CITA rules currently in effect for implementing the China-specific safeguards
only provide specific guidance for petitions filed on the basis of actual import
increases and corresponding evidence of market disruption. Moreover, Chinese
government officials have commented that putting all the blame on China for
recent textile trade disputes is "groundless." China's Trade Minister Bo Xilai
charged the United States and the European Union of using double standards in
their trade dealings, saying, "Double standards should not be adopted in
international trade where you demand free trade for your own products, while
restrictions are placed on the competitive products of developing countries. This
kind of trade protectionism will only harm the healthy development of trade.
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted).
200. See China Protests, supra note 199 (accusing the United States of abuse).
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predictability and transparency are necessary steps to achieving reliable
business operations and improving foreign relations.2 1
The recently signed U.S.-China Textile Agreement has temporarily
mitigated tensions between the two trading partners, and restored some
level of certainty to the business operations of U.S. textile importers for
202thirty-four categories of textile products. It remains to be seen,
however, whether CITA will exercise the promised restraint in pending
and future safeguard requests covering those categories not included in
the U.S.-China Textile Agreement. 20' The agreement does not resolve
the problem that CITA's procedures lack consistency and transparency
concerning these excluded categories . Promulgating domestic law to
201. See MOU, supra note 14, pmbl., para. 7. The Preamble specifically states that a
main goal of the agreement is "resolving trade concerns through consultations." Id. pmbl.
Paragraph 7 further provides:
The United States and China will work to create a stable environment for
bilateral trade in all textile and apparel products. The United States shall not
request consultations with China pursuant to Paragraph 242 with respect to any
textile or apparel product integrated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 before January 1, 2002. In addition, the United States shall not
request consultations with China pursuant to Paragraph 242 with respect to any
textile or apparel product listed in Annex I. With respect to all other textile and
apparel products not subject to agreed levels under this Memorandum, the
United States shall exercise restraint concerning the application of its rights under
Paragraph 242.
Id. para. 7 (emphasis added).
202. Id. para. 2; see also Fong & Hitt, supra note 198 ("The agreement, still tentative,
is expected to significantly reduce uncertainty hanging over U.S. retailers and Chinese
manufacturers .... ).
203. Memorandum from Laura E. Jones, U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel, to
Members, U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel 2 (Nov. 17, 2005) (on file with
author).
Five pending safeguard requests on products not included in the November 8
U.S.-China Agreement should be dead. However, CITA has now raised a
question regarding that assumption. Specifically, CITA announced that it is
postponing decisions on safeguard requests for categories not included in the
agreement, until November 30. Some decisions had been due on November 8,
the day the agreement was signed. Others had previously been postponed until
November 30....
While CITA's announcement suggesting that it is still considering these
safeguard requests is highly disconcerting, the commitment contained in the
agreement, that the United States will exercise "restraint" in considering
additional safeguard requests, argues strongly against implementation of those
requests.
Id. at 1-2; see, e.g., Extension of Period of Determination on Request for Textile and
Apparel Safeguard Action on Imports from China, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,456 (Nov. 7, 2005).
204. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. This issue is exacerbated by
CITA's ostensibly unbridled authority. Hitt, supra note 8 ("CITA's founding charter gives
it unilateral power to impose limits on textile imports. Its actions are final. Its
deliberations are exempt from public disclosure on the grounds that they have foreign-
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incorporate transparency and consistency in all categories is necessary to
• .. .- 205
maintain positive business and foreign trading relationships. Absent
some meaningful way of holding CITA accountable for employing
implementation procedures that will "provid[e] the textile and apparel
industries in the United States and China with a stable and predictable
trading environment, ''206 U.S. textile importers will continue to suffer
financial loss, and relationships with foreign trading partners will
continue to deteriorate.2 7
IV. CONCLUSION
U.S. Ass'n of Importers II incorrectly limited the availability and scope
of judicial review of CITA's reinterpretation of its procedures for the
consideration of requests for textile-specific safeguards. Consequently,
U.S. textile importers have suffered irreparable harm in the form of
financial loss, loss of reputation in business operations, and strained
relationships with foreign trading partners. Absent the establishment of
clear, objective, and consistent procedures governing the implementation
of textile-specific safeguards, U.S. textile importers will continue to
suffer.
policy implications. Until recently, CITA publicized its decisions only through filings in
the Federal Register.").
205. See Hitt, supra note 8 (discussing CITA's bias toward the domestic textile
manufacturing industry, the absence of any checks on CITA's actions, and the enormous
amount of pressure on CITA from powerful industry lobbyists). James C. Leonard III,
Chairman of CITA, previously a prominent member of, and advocate for, the domestic
textile manufacturing community, states that CITA is intended to be unbiased, but
concedes that it has a "protectionist bent." Id. The Chairman further describes CITA's
"core mission" as "'trying to help maintain a domestic manufacturing industry."' Id.
206. MOU, supra note 14, pmbl.
207. See supra notes 197-202.
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